This paper develops a parsimonious descriptive model of individual choice and valuation in the kinds of experiments that constitute a substantial part of the literature.
Introduction
This paper develops a parsimonious descriptive model of risky choice which can organise much of the most influential experimental evidence of systematic departures from conventional decision theory. Focusing on the kind of tasks which constitute much of the evidence -that is, choices between pairs of lotteries involving no more than three outcomes, and/or valuations of such lotteries -it will be shown that individuals who behave according to this model will violate all but one of the key axioms of rational choice -the only exception being transparent dominance.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 sets up the basic framework.
Section 2 models the perception of probabilities and shows that one simple proposition about the way that probabilities are handled is enough to ensure that the axioms of independence, betweenness and transitivity are all bound to fail in one way or another. This section identifies a number of novel predictions of regularities which, if borne out by further tests, would contradict the class of rank-dependent models that are currently regarded as offering the best alternative to standard expected utility theory. Section 3 models an analogous proposition about the way that payoffs are perceived, and this allows the model to explain a number of other regularities which cannot be accommodated by expected utility theory or any of its main rivals. Section 4 discussed the relationship between the model proposed here and a number of other axiomatic or behavioural models which have attempted to organise various subsets of regularities. Section 5 concludes.
The Modelling Framework
Before outlining the particular framework for this model, three remarks.
First, although there is one decision theoretic tradition which involves identifying some set of general axioms (often selected on the basis of their supposed normative appeal) and then deriving the implications for any given class of cases, this paper is not in that tradition. Rather, the model in this paper is a behavioural model, concerned with why people may be liable to act in certain systematic ways in response to particular kinds of stimuli. The model is set out formally in order to allow implications to be derived, but it is important to keep in mind that it is a model of decisions often made quite quickly 1 and on the basis of perceptions rather than after long deliberation involving complex calculation. The structure of the model is therefore intended to capture tendencies in the ways perceptions are formed and judgments are made: it is not suggested that people actually make calculations strictly according to the formulae.
Second, although it is intended to explain observed patterns of behaviour, it is only a model, and therefore simplifies. In particular, although actual responses are susceptible to 'noise' and error, the exposition initially abstracts from that and presents a deterministic model 2 . The exposition also abstracts from failures of procedure invariance and framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986) . Such effects undoubtedly influence behaviour, but the claim being made in this paper is that we can explain many regularities without needing to invoke those additional effects.
On the other hand, the proposed model rests on just two basic propositions involving just two free parameters and it would be surprising if this were sufficient to account for all of the many regularities observed in the relevant class of decision experiments.
But that is not the claim. This is not a theory of everything. Nevertheless, those two basic propositions combine to organise many more of the known regularities than any other single model currently available, and in the course of doing so, help us to identify where -and more importantly, perhaps, why -those other models are liable to fall short.
Third, in addition to organising much of the existing data, the model also allows/predicts patterns which have not (yet) been much observed, except somewhat serendipitously, as by-products of designs with other primary objectives. Where I am aware of such evidence, I shall refer to it. But this is principally a theoretical paper: it aims to provide a new model and it will identify a number of ways in which that model is differentiated from existing alternatives. It suggests directions for new experimental research, but the conduct of such research is beyond the scope of this paper.
Having made those preliminary points, let us now turn to the formulation of the model. The bulk of the experimental data used to test theories of risk come from Moffatt (2005) analysed a pairwise choice dataset where mean decision times mostly ranged between 3 and 8 seconds per choice. This may be a somewhat extreme case, but it would not be uncommon to find the great majority of participants taking no more than 15 or 20 seconds to process most of the kinds of decisions presented in many choice / valuation experiments. 2 Section 4 will discuss (briefly) the question of extending the model to allow for the stochastic nature of decision behaviour. As noted above, we are dealing with data generated quite quickly and somewhat impressionistically and it would be surprising if there were not some stochastic component in such data; but the model abstracts from that and focuses on what may be regarded as 'central tendencies '. decisions that can be represented in terms of pairs of alternative lotteries, each involving no more than three monetary payoffs. and p 1 , while the corresponding probabilities for the riskier lottery R are q 3 , q 2 and q 1 , with q 3 > p 3 , q 2 < p 2 and q 1 > p 1 .
Although this template is broad enough to accommodate any pairwise choice or valuation involving up to three payoffs, the great majority of experimental tasks involve simpler formats -most commonly, with S being either a sure thing (where p 2 = 1) or else a two-payoff lottery (with p 3 = 0; 1 > p 2 , p 1 > 0) versus a two-payoff R lottery (q 2 = 0, 1 > q 3 , q 1 > 0). A certainty equivalent valuation can be modelled as the case where p 2 is set at 1 and the respondent is asked to identify the value of x 2 which makes her indifferent between S and R.
Within this framework, a choice can be seen as a judgment between two arguments pulling in opposite directions. The argument in favour of R is that it offers some chance -the difference between q 3 and p 3 -of getting x 3 rather than x 2 . Against that, the argument in favour of S is that it offers a better chance -in this case, the difference between q 1 and p 1 -of getting x 2 rather than x 1 .
Most decision theories represent the force of these arguments in some formal way and then propose, in effect, that choice depends on the relative force of the competing arguments. To illustrate, consider expected utility theory (EUT). Under EUT, the advantage that R offers over S on the payoff dimension is given by the subjective difference between x 3 and x 2 -that is, u(x 3 )-u(x 2 ), where u(.) is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function -which is weighted by the probability of that difference, q 3 -p 3 . Correspondingly, the advantage that S offers over R is the utility difference u(x 2 )-u(x 1 ), weighted by the probability of that difference, q 1 -p 1 . Denoting strict preference by f and indifference by ~, EUT entails:
p < Alternatively, Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) cumulative prospect theory (CPT), modifies this expression in two ways: it draws the subjective values of payoffs from a value function v(.) rather than a vNM utility function u(.); and it involves the nonlinear transformation of probabilities into decision weights, here denoted by π(.).
Thus for CPT we have:
p < Under both EUT and CPT, it is as if an individual maps each payoff to some subjective utility/value, weights each of these by some (function of) its probability, and thereby arrives at an overall evaluation or 'score' for each lottery which is then used to compare alternatives, with the decision rule being to choose the one with the highest evaluation. By assigning to each lottery a score that is determined entirely by the interaction between the decision maker's preferences and the characteristics of that particular lottery (that is, independent of any other lotteries in the available choice set), such models guarantee respect for transitivity. In addition, the functions and procedures which govern subjective values and decision weights may be specified in ways which guarantee respect for monotonicity and first order stochastic dominance 4 .
However, for any theory to perform well descriptively, its structure needs to correspond with the way participants perceive stimuli and act on those perceptions. If the way they actually make judgments runs counter to some feature(s) of a theory, the observed data are liable to diverge systematically from the implications of that theory.
It is a central proposition of this paper that participants' perceptions and judgments are liable to operate in ways which run counter to the assumptions underpinning most decision theories, including EUT and CPT. In particular, there is much psychological evidence suggesting that many people do not evaluate alternatives separately and purely on the basis of the 'absolute' levels of their attributes, but that their judgments and choices are also liable to be influenced by 'relative' considerations -see, for example, Stewart et al. (2003) . In the context of pairwise choices between lotteries, this may entail individuals making between-lottery comparisons of both probabilities and payoffs, and having their perceptions and judgments systematically affected by such comparisons.
To help bridge from a conventional theory such as EUT to a model which allows for between-lottery considerations, rearrange Expression (1) as follows:
p < A verbal interpretation of this is: "S is judged preferable to / indifferent to / less preferable than R according to whether the relative force of the argument for S compared with R on the probability dimension -that is, (q 1 -p 1 )/(q 3 -p 3 ) -is greater than / equal to / less than the relative force of the argument for R compared with S on
Under EUT, the ratios on each side are simply the ratios of two values determined independently and solely on the basis of within-lottery features 5 . But if participants in experiments also make comparisons between the two alternatives, their 5 This is also true for CPT: the CPT counterpart to Expression (3) takes the form:
and the π(.)'s are all derived via an algorithm that operates entirely within their respective lotteries.
perceptions of these ratios may be influenced by considerations that are absent from theories such as EUT and CPT, with the result that observed patterns of response may deviate systematically from the patterns entailed by those models.
The next section discusses how we might allow for between-lottery comparisons on the probability dimension, and identifies the possible implications for a variety of decision scenarios involving just three payoffs. Section 3 will do something similar for the payoff dimension. But first, the probability dimension.
Modelling Probability Judgments
We start with one of the most widely replicated of all experimental regularities: the form of 'Allais paradox' that has come to be known as the 'common ratio effect' (CRE) -see Allais (1953) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) .
Consider the two pairwise choices shown in Figure 2 . In terms of the template in Figure 1 , x 3 = 40, x 2 = 30 and x 1 = 0. In Choice #1, p 2 = 1 (so that p 3 = p 1 = 0) while q 3 = 0.8, q 2 = 0 and q 1 = 0.2. Substituting these values into Expression (3), the implication of EUT is that
p < Choice #2 can be derived from Choice #1 by scaling down the probabilities of x 3 and x 2 by the same factor -in this example, by a quarter -and increasing the probabilities of x 1 accordingly. Applying EUT as above gives
The expression for the relative weight of argument for R versus S on the payoff dimension is the same for both (4) and (5) 
Meanwhile, the expression for the relative weight of argument for S versus R on the probability dimension changes from 0.2/0.8 in (4) to 0.05/0.2 in (5). Since these two ratios are equal, the implication of EUT is that the balance of relative arguments is exactly the same for both choices: an EU maximiser should either pick S in both choices, or else pick R on both occasions However, countless experiments using CRE pairs like those in Figure 2 find otherwise: many individuals violate EUT by choosing S 1 in Choice #1 and R 2 in Choice #2, while the opposite departure -choosing R 1 and S 2 -is relatively rarely observed. CPT can accommodate this asymmetry. To see how, consider the CPT versions of (4) and (5):
p < As with EUT, the relative argument on the payoff dimension is the same for both expressions. But the nonlinear transformation of the probabilities means that the relative strength of the argument for S versus R on the probability dimension decreases as we move from Choice #1 to Choice #2. Using the parameters estimated in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , [1-π(0.8 However, there may be other ways of explaining that pattern. This paper proposes an alternative account which gives much the same result in this scenario but which has quite different implications from CPT for some other cases.
To help set up the intuition behind this model, we start with Rubinstein's (1988) idea that some notion of similarity might explain the CRE, as follows 6 . In
Choice #1, the two lotteries differ substantially on both the probability and the payoff dimensions; and although the expected value of 32 offered by R 1 is higher than the certainty of 30 offered by S 1 , the majority of respondents choose S 1 , a result which Rubinstein ascribed to risk aversion operating in such cases. However, the effect of scaling down the probabilities of the positive payoffs in Choice #2 may be to cause many respondents to consider those scaled-down probabilities to be similar (or "approximately the same", or "inconsequential") 7 , and therefore respondents might pay less attention to them and give decisive weight instead to the dimension which remains dissimilar -namely, the payoff dimension, which favours R 2 over S 2 .
Similarity theory can be deployed to explain a number of other regularities besides the CRE (see, for example, Leland (1994) , (1998)). However, one possible limitation might be the dichotomous nature of the similarity judgment: that is, above some (not very clearly specified) threshold, two stimuli are considered dissimilar and processed as under EUT; but below that threshold, they become similar and the difference between them is then regarded as inconsequential.
Nevertheless, the similarity notion reflects two thoughts: first, that the individual is liable to make between-lottery comparisons of probabilities; and second, that although the objective ratio of the relevant probabilities remains the same as both are scaled down by the same factor, the smaller difference between them in Choice #2
affects the perception of that ratio. The model in this paper incorporates those two ideas in a way that enables us to derive a number of new implications.
When setting the model up, it makes the notation more compact if we replace q 1 -p 1 by b S (to signify that this is the probability that S will give a better outcome) and correspondingly replace q 3 -p 3 -the probability difference favouring R -by b R . We also replace the payoff advantage offered by R over S -that is, x 3 -x 2 -by y R , and replace the payoff advantage of S over R -namely, x 2 -x 1 -by y S . Finally, we model the 'perceived relative argument for S compared with R on the probability dimension'
as some function of b S and b R denoted by φ(b S , b R ), and we correspondingly represent the 'perceived relative argument for R compared with S on the payoff dimension' by some function of y R and y S denoted by ξ(y R , y S ). The general decision rule is that participants in experiments choose according to the balance of perceived arguments, so that 
To repeat a point made at the beginning of Section 1, it is not being claimed that individuals consciously calculate the modified ratio according to (9), any more than the proponents of CPT claim that individuals actually set about calculating decision weights according to the somewhat complex rank-dependent algorithm in that model. What the CPT algorithm is intended to capture is the idea of some probabilities being underweighted and others being overweighted when individual lotteries are being evaluated, with this underweighting and overweighting tending to be systematically associated with payoffs according to their rank within the lottery.
Likewise, what the formulation in (9) aims to capture is the idea that differences interact with ratios in a way which is consistent with perceptions of the relative weight of a ratio being influenced by between-lottery considerations.
To illustrate this, consider how (9) is applied to the CRE scenario in Figure 2 .
Notice first that when α = 0, (b S +b R ) α = 1, so that φ(b S , b R ) is then simply b S /b R : that is, the perceived relative argument coincides with the objective ratio. On this reading, α might be thought of as a person-specific behavioural characteristic: someone for whom α = 0 is someone who takes probabilities and their ratios just as they are, as EUT supposes; whereas someone for whom α is less than 0 is liable to have their judgment of ratios influenced by differences.
Notice also that when b S +b R = 1 (which means that probabilities are scaled up to their maximum extent), all individuals (whatever their α) perceive the ratio as it objectively is. This should not be taken too literally. The intention is not to insist that there is no divergence between perceived and objective ratios when the decision problem is as scaled-up as it can be. At this point, for at least some people, there might be some divergence in the opposite direction 8 . However, all the model needs to assume for present purposes is that when b S +b R = 1, the perceived relative argument for S versus R takes the objective ratio as its baseline value.
As the probabilities are scaled down, b S +b R falls. For a scenario like the one in may be less than ξ(y R , y S ) in #2. Thus PRAM also allows the non-EU combination of S 1 and R 2 so often observed, while disallowing the opposite combination of R 1 and S 2 .
However, although PRAM and CPT have much the same implications for pairs of choices like those in Figure 2 , there are other common ratio scenarios for which they make opposing predictions. their Table 7 ) involved choices where (x 3 -x 2 ) = $14 and (x 2 -x 1 ) = $6 with b S /b R = 2.33.
Scaling down by one-fifth resulted in 16 departures from EUT (out of a sample of 33), with 10 of those switching from R in the scaled-up pair to S in the scaled-down pair (in keeping with PRAM) while only 6 exhibited the 'usual' common ratio pattern.
Another instance can be found in Bateman et al. (2006) . In their Experiment 3, 100 participants were presented with two series of choices involving different sets of payoffs. In each set there were CRE questions where b S /b R was 0.25, and in both sets a clear pattern of the usual kind was observed: the ratio of S 1 &R 2 : S 2 &R 1 was 37:16
in Set 1 and 29:5 in Set 2. In each set there were also CRE questions where b S /b R was greater than 1 -although only 1.5 -and in these cases the same participants generated S 1 &R 2 : S 2 &R 1 ratios of 13:21 in Set 1 and 10:16 in Set 2. One can only speculate about whether the 'counter' asymmetries in the latter cases would have been stronger if the b S /b R ratio in these latter cases had been nearer to the inverse of the 0.25 ratio in the former cases.
So although the existing evidence in this respect is suggestive, it is too sparse to be conclusive; and as will become clear, there is also often a dearth of extant evidence in other areas where PRAM has different implications from CPT.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence, and the remainder of this section will identify a number of other ways in which the implications of PRAM differ from those generated by existing theories.
When examining and comparing the implications of various decision theories for the kinds of choices that fit the Figure 1 template, many authors have found it helpful to represent such choices visually by using a Marschak-Machina (M-M)
triangle -see Machina (1982) -as shown in Figure 3 . The vertical edge of the triangle shows the probability of x 3 and the horizontal edge shows the probability of x 1 . Any residual probability is the probability of x 2 . will depend on the value of α for the individual in question; but so long as α < 0, we can be sure that the pairs will be ordered from lowest to highest φ(b S , b R ) as in Table   1 . This allows us to say how any such individual will choose, depending on where his ξ(y R , y S ) stands in comparison with φ(b S , b R ). We do not yet need to know more precisely how ξ(y R , y S ) is specified by PRAM, except to know that it is a function of the three payoffs and is the same for all choices involving just those three payoffs 10 . for all pairs in that table, meaning that in every case the safer alternative -the one listed first in each pair -will be chosen. In such a case, the observed pattern of choice will be indistinguishable from that of a risk averse EU maximiser.
However, consider an individual for whom ξ(y R , y S ) is higher than the lowest will cause B to be chosen over A. In conjunction with the choice of C over F, this would be more in keeping with fanning out in more south-easterly part of the triangle but fanning in in the more north-westerly area. Again, there is rather less evidence about choices in the north-west of the triangle than in the south-east, but Camerer (1995) refers to some evidence consistent with fanning in towards that top corner, and in response to this kind of evidence, some other non-EU models -for example, Gul (1991) -were developed to have this 'mixed fanning' property 11 .
Thus far, however, it might seem that the implications of PRAM are not
radically different from what might be implied by CPT and other non-EU variants which, between them, could offer accounts of each of the regularities discussed above -although, as Bernasconi (1994, p.69) 
Indeed, if PRAM is modelling perceptions appropriately, it is easy to show that, for any triple of pairwise choices derived from three lotteries on the same straight line, there will always be some range of ξ(y R , y S ) that will produce a violation of transitivity in the form of a 'betweenness cycle'.
To see this, set x 3 , x 2 , x 1 and q 3 such that an individual acting according to PRAM is indifferent between L = (x 2 , 1) and N = (x 3 , q 3 ;
Since the value of ξ(., .) is determined by the set of the three payoffs, ξ(., 
As they stand, with L ~ N, these are weak violations of transitivity; but it is easy to see that by decreasing q 3 very slightly when b < 1 (and thereby producing L f N), or by increasing q 3 enough when b > 1 to produce N f L, strict violations of transitivity result for (nearly) all 0 < λ < 1 and α < 0.
The implication of betweenness cycles is one which sets PRAM apart from EUT and all non-EU models that entail transitivity. But is there any evidence of such cycles? Such evidence as there is comes largely as a by-product of experiments with other objectives, but there is at least some evidence. For example, Buschena and Zilberman (1999) cycled in the PRAM direction as opposed to just 8 who cycled only in the opposite direction. If both propensities to cycle were equally likely to occur by chance, the probability of the ratio 38:8 is less than 0.00001; and even if all 11 'mixed cyclers' were counted against the PRAM implication, the probability of the ratio 38:19 would still be less than 0.01.
So PRAM has a striking and distinctive implication concerning transitivity over lotteries within any given triangle. As will be shown in the next section, where the functional form of ξ(y R , y S ) is discussed in more detail, these implications are not limited to lotteries within particular triangles, and a broader class of systematic intransitivities can be accommodated. However, before expanding the discussion in that way, a broader implication of the modelling of φ(b S , b R ) merits some attention. Table 1 upside down, thereby also reversing the direction of the violations of betweenness -i.e. D is now less preferred than both C and F rather than being preferred to both of them, while E is now liable to be picked over both C and F rather than being less preferred than both of them. Finally, by way of drawing this section to a close, are there any well-known regularities within the M-M triangle that PRAM does not explain? It would be remarkable if a single formula on the probability dimension involving just one 'perception parameter' α were able to capture absolutely every well-known regularity as well as predicting several others. It would not be surprising if human perceptions were susceptible to more than just one effect, and there may be other factors entering into similarity judgments besides the one proposed here. For example, Buschena and Zilberman (1999) suggested that when all pairs of lotteries are transformations of some base pair such as {C, F} in Figure 3 However, the more immediate concern is to extend the model beyond sets of decisions consisting of no more than three payoffs between them. To that end, the next section considers how perceptions might operate on the payoff dimension. . That is, these models, like many others, map from the objective money amount to an individual's subjective value of that amount via a utility or value function, and then suppose that the relative argument for one alternative against another can be encapsulated in terms of the ratio of the differences between these subjective values.
So modelling payoff judgments may be broken down into two components: the subjective difference between any two payoffs; and how pairs of such differences are compared and perceived.
Consider first the conversion of payoffs into subjective values/utilities. It is widely accepted that -in the domain of gains at least -v(.) or u(.) are concave functions of payoffs, reflecting diminishing marginal utility and/or diminishing sensitivity. Certainly, if we take the most neutral base case -S offering some sure x 2 , while R offers a 50-50 chance of x 3 or x 1 -it is widely believed that most people will choose S whenever x 2 is equal to the expected (money) value of R; and indeed, that many will choose S even when x 2 is somewhat less than that expected value -this often being interpreted as signifying risk aversion in the domain of gains. In line with this, PRAM also supposes that payoffs map to subjective values via a function c(.), which is (weakly) concave in the domain of gains 12 . To simplify notation, c(x i ) will be denoted by c i .
On that supposition, the basic building block of ξ(y R , y S ) is (c 3 -c 2 )/(c 2 -c 1 ), which is henceforth denoted by c R /c S . This is the counterpart to b S /b R in the specification of φ(b S , b R ). So to put the second component of the model in place, we apply the same intuition about similarity to the payoff dimension as was applied to probabilities, and posit that the perceived ratio is liable to diverge more and more 12 Actually, the strict concavity of this function, although it probably corresponds with the way most people would behave when presented with 50-50 gambles, is not necessary in order to produce many of the results later in this section, where a linear c(.) is sufficient. And since there are at least some commentators who think that the degree of risk aversion seemingly exhibited in experiments is surprisingly high -see, for example, Rabin ( With ξ(y R , y S ) specified in this way, a number of results can be derived. In so doing, the strategy will be to abstract initially from any effect due to any nonlinearity of c(.) by examining first the implications of setting c i = x i .
First, we can derive the so-called fourfold pattern of risk attitudes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) whereby individuals are said to be risk-seeking over lowprobability high-win gambles, risk-averse over high-probability low-win gambles, risk-seeking over high-probability low-loss gambles and risk-averse over lowprobability high-loss gambles.
This pattern is entailed by PRAM, even when c(.) is assumed to be linear within and across gains and losses. To see this, start in the domain of gains and consider an R lottery of the form (x 3 , q 3 ; 0, 1-q 3 ) with the expected value x 2  (= q 3 .x 3 ). less than 1 and so with δ > 1, ξ(y R , y S ) is even smaller: hence S is chosen in preference to R, an observation that is conventionally taken to signify risk aversion.
However, whenever q 3 < 0.5, φ(b S , b R ) is greater than 1 and ξ(y R , y S ) is bigger than φ(b S , b R ), so that now R is chosen over S, which is conventionally taken to signify risk seeking. Thus we have the first two elements of the 'fourfold attitude to risk' -riskaversion over high-probability low-win gambles and risk-seeking over lowprobability high-win gambles in the domain of gains. And it is easy to see that if we locate R in the domain of losses, with q 3 now the probability of 0 and with the expected value of R held constant at q 1 .x 1 = x 2 , the other two elements of the fourfold pattern -risk-aversion over low-probability high-loss gambles and risk-seeking over high-probability low-loss gambles -are also entailed by PRAM.
The fact that these patterns can be obtained even when c(.) is linear breaks the usual association between risk attitude and the curvature of the utility/value function and suggests that at least part of what is conventionally described as risk attitude might instead be attributable to the way that the perceived relativities on the probability and payoff dimensions vary as the skewness of R is altered. If c(.) were nonlinear -and in particular, if it were everywhere concave, as u(.) is often supposed to be, the above results would be modified somewhat: when q 3 = 0.5 and x 2 /x 3 = 0.5, (c 3 -c 2 )/c 2 < 0.5, so that S would be chosen over R for q 3 = 0.5, and might continue to be chosen for some range of q 3 below 0.5, depending on the curvature of c(.) and the value of δ. Nevertheless, it could still easily happen that below some point, there is a range of q 3 where R is chosen. Likewise, continuing concavity into the domain of losses is liable to move all of the relative arguments somewhat in favour of S, but there may still be a range of high-probability low-loss R which are chosen over S. In short, and in contrast with CPT, PRAM does use convexity in the domain of losses to explain the fourfold pattern.
Still, even if they reach the result by different routes, PRAM and CPT share the fourfold pattern implication. However, there is a related regularity where they part company: namely, the preference reversal phenomenon and the cycle that is its counterpart in pairwise choice. In the language of the preference reversal phenomenon (see Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971, and Seidl, 2000) a low-probability high-win gamble is a $-bet while a high-probability low-win gamble is a P-bet. The widelyreplicated form of preference reversal occurs when an individual places a higher certainty equivalent value on the $-bet than on the P-bet but picks the P-bet in a straight choice between the two. Denoting the bets by $ and P, and their certainty equivalents as sure sums of money CE $ and CE P such that CE $ ~ $ and CE P ~ P, the 'classic' and frequently-observed reversal occurs when CE $ > CE P but P f $. The opposite reversal -placing a higher certainty equivalent on the P-bet but picking the $-bet in a straight choice -is relatively rarely observed.
Let X be some sure amount of money such that CE $ > X > CE P . Then the 'classic' preference reversal translates into the choice cycle $ f X, X f P, P f $.
However, this cycle and the preference reversal phenomenon are both incompatible with CPT and other models which have transitivity built into their structure: if $ f X and X f P -which is what the fourfold pattern entails when X is the expected value of the two bets -then transitivity requires $ f P in any choice between those two, and also requires that this ordering be reflected in their respective certainty equivalents.
Any strong asymmetric pattern of cycles and/or any asymmetric disparity between choice and valuation cannot be explained by CPT or any other transitive model 13 .
By contrast, PRAM entails both the common form of preference reversal and the corresponding choice cycle. To see this, consider and show that the result does not require any nonlinearity of c(.), let c i = x i . We have already seen from the discussion of the fourfold pattern that under these conditions, when X is a sure sum equal to the expected value of both bets, $ f X and X f P. For a 13 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) are very clear in stating that prospect theory is strictly a theory of pairwise choice, and they did not apply it to valuation (or other 'matching') tasks. In their 1992 exposition of CPT they repeat this statement about the domain of the theory, and to the extent that they use certainty equivalent data to estimate the parameters of their value and weighting functions, they do so by inferring these data from an iterative choice procedure. Strictly speaking, therefore, CPT can only be said to have an implication for choices -and in this case, choice cycles (which it does not allow).
Other rank-dependent models make no such clear distinction between choice and valuation and therefore also entail that valuations should be ordered in the same way as choices.
cycle to occur, PRAM must also allow P f $. To see what PRAM entails for this pair, we need to derive φ(b P , b $ ) and ξ(y $ , y P ).
Since b P = (1-λ)q and b $ = λq,
And since y $ = [(1-λ)X/λq] and y P = X/q, ξ(y $ , y P ) = (
Thus the choice between P and $ depends on whether λ is greater than or less than 0.5 in conjunction with whether q α is greater than or less than δ. Since α and δ are person-specific parameters, consider first an individual whose perceptions are such that q α > δ ≥ 1. In cases where λ > 0.5 and therefore (1-λ)/λ < 1, such an individual will judge φ(b P , b $ ) < ξ(y $ , y P ) and will pick the $-bet, so that no cycle occurs. But where λ < 0.5, that same individual will judge φ(b P , b $ ) > ξ(y $ , y P ) and will pick the P-bet, thereby exhibiting the cycle $ f X, X f P, P f $. Since PRAM supposes that valuations are generated within the same framework and on the basis of the same person-specific parameters as choices, $ f X entails CE $ > X and X f P entails X > CE P , that such an individual will also exhibit the classic form of preference reversal, CE $ > CE P in conjunction with P f $.
Next consider an individual whose perceptions are such that δ > q α ≥ 1. For such an individual, λ < 0.5 entails φ(b P , b $ ) < ξ(y $ , y P ) so that she will pick the $-bet and no cycle will be observed. But in cases where λ > 0.5, she will judge φ(b P , b $ ) > ξ(y $ , y P ) and will pick the P-bet, thereby exhibiting the cycle $ f X, X f P, P f $. So although this individual will exhibit a cycle under different values of λ than the first individual, the implication is that any cycle she does exhibit will be in same direction -namely, the direction consistent with the classic form of preference reversal.
Thus under the conditions in the domain of gains exemplified in Figure 4 , PRAM entails cycles in the expected direction but not in the opposite direction. On the other hand, if we 'reflect' the lotteries into the domain of losses by reversing the sign on each non-zero payoff, the effect is to reverse all of the above implications:
now the model entails cycles in the opposite direction.
Besides the large body of preference reversal data (again, see Seidl, 2000) there is also empirical evidence of this asymmetric patterns of cycles -see, for example, Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman (1990) and Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1991) . In addition, the opposite asymmetry in the domain of losses was reported in Loomes & Taylor (1992) .
Those last two papers were motivated by a desire to test regret theory (Bell, 1982; Fishburn, 1982; Sugden, 1982 and , which has the same implications as PRAM for these parameters. But the implications of regret theory and PRAM diverge under different parameters. To see this, scale all the probabilities of positive payoffs (including X, previously offered with probability 1) down by a factor p (and in the case of X, add a 1-p probability of zero) to produce the three lotteries shown in Figure 5 . δ when δ > 1. However, as p is reduced, p α increases, and at the point where it becomes larger than δ, φ(b X' , b $' ) becomes greater than ξ(y $' , y X' ) so that the individual now chooses X' over $'. Likewise, when p = 1, the scaled-up X was chosen over the scaled-up P; but as p is reduced, φ(b X' , b P' ) falls and becomes smaller than ξ(y P' , y X' ) at the point where p α becomes larger than δ. So once this point is reached, instead of $ f X and X f P we have P' f X' and X' f $'.
Whether a 'reverse' cycle is observed then depends on the choice between $' and P'. Modifying and combining Expressions (11) and (12) we have
so that S' will be chosen in cases where (1-λ)/λ > 1 and (pq) α > δ. In such cases -and (1-λ)/λ > 1 is typical of many preference reversal experiments -the result will be the cycle P' f X', X' f $', $' f P'. The opposite cycle will not occur once p has fallen sufficiently to produce p α > δ (although, of course, the value of p at which this occurs may vary greatly from one individual to another).
Such 'similarity cycles' were reported by Tversky (1969) and were replicated by Lindman and Lyons (1978) and Budescu and Weiss (1987) . More recently, Bateman et al. (2006) reported such cycles in two separate experiments with rather different payoff parameters than those used by Tversky. Those experiments had been designed primarily to explore the CRE, and the data concerning cycles were an unintended by-product. Even so, there were four triples that fitted the Figure 5 format and in all four of these, similarity cycles outnumbered cycles in the opposite direction to a highly significant extent. predominate when the lotteries were scaled up, while there was a strong asymmetry favouring similarity cycles among the scaled-down lotteries.
There is a variant upon this last result for which some evidence has recently appeared. Look again at X' in Figure 5 : it is, in effect, a P-bet. Likewise, P' from Figure 5 could be regarded as a $-bet. Finally, let us relabel $' in Figure 5 as Y, a 'yardstick' lottery offering a higher payoff -call it x* -than either of the other two.
Instead of asking respondents to state certainty equivalents for P and $, we could ask them to state probability equivalents for each lottery -respectively, PE P and PE $ -by setting the probabilities of x* that would make them indifferent between that lottery and the yardstick 15 . If, for some predetermined probability (such as λpq in Figure 5 ), the individual exhibits a 'similarity cycle' Y f $, $ f P, P f Y, then the probability equivalence task requires setting the probability of x* at something less than λpq in order to establish PE $ ~ S, while it involves setting the probability of x* at something greater than λpq in order to generate PE P ~ P. Thus for valuations elicited in the form of probability equivalents, PRAM entails the opposite of the classic preference reversal i.e. it allows the possibility of PE P > PE $ in conjunction with $ f P. A recent study by Butler and Loomes (2007) reported exactly this pattern: a substantial asymmetry in the direction of 'classic' preference reversals when a sample of respondents gave certainty equivalents for a particular {$, P} pair; and the opposite asymmetry when that same sample were asked to provide probability equivalents for the very same {$, P} pair.
There are other implications of PRAM omitted for lack of space 16 , but the discussion thus far is sufficient to show that PRAM is not only fundamentally different from CPT and other non-EU models that entail transitivity but also that it diverges from one of the best-known nontransitive models in the form of regret theory. This may therefore the moment to focus attention on the essential respects in which PRAM differs from these other models, and to consider in more detail the 15 Such tasks are widely used in health care settings where index numbers (under EUT, these are the equivalent of utilities) for health states lying somewhere between full health and death are elicited by probability equivalent tasks, often referred to as 'standard gambles'. 16 In the earlier formulation of the model some indication was given of the way in which the model could accommodate other phenomena, such as Fishburn's (1988) 'strong' preference reversals. Reference was also made to possible explanations of violations of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom and of varying attitudes to ambiguity. Details are available from the author on request.
possible lessons not only for those other models but for the broader enterprise of developing decision theories and using experiments to try to test them.
Relationship With, And Implications For, Other Models
The discussion so far has focused principally on the way that PRAM compares with and diverges from EUT and from CPT (taken to be the 'flagship' of non-EU models), with some more limited reference to other variants in the broad tradition of 'rational' theories of choice. In the paragraphs immediately below, more will be said about the relationship between PRAM and these models. However, as noted in the introduction, PRAM is more in the tradition of psychological/behavioural models, and in the latter part of this section there will be a discussion of the ways in which PRAM may be seen as building upon, but differentiated from, those models.
First, the most widely used decision model, EUT, is a special case of PRAM where α = 0 and δ = 1. This means that individuals are assumed to act as if all differences and ratios on both the probability and utility dimensions are perceived and processed exactly as they are, save only for random errors. PRAM shows that once we allow interactions which affect the judgments and perceptions of these ratios, many implications of EUT fail descriptively.
However, the ability of alternative models to accommodate such failures may also be limited by the extent to which they rule out such interactions. So CPT fails for two main reasons. First, although it replaces u(.) by v(.), it makes essentially the same assumption in terms of a consequence carrying its assigned value into every scenario, with differences and ratios between those values being processed independently and exactly as they are -that is, as if δ = 1. So the kinds of choice cycles described above as 'regret' and 'similarity' cycles cannot be accounted for. Second, although CPT and other rank-dependent models allow probabilities to be transformed nonlinearly, and can even assign the same probability a different weight depending on its 'rank' within a lottery and the magnitudes of the other probabilities in that same lottery, CPT disallows any between-lottery influences on this transformation 17 .
Other models can achieve some CPT-like results by a different within-lottery route: for example, disappointment theory (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986) keeps probabilities as they are, but allows within-lottery interactions between payoffs in ways which can accommodate certain violations of independence. However, what rank-dependent models and disappointment theory have in common is that they effectively assign 'scores' to each lottery as a whole which that lottery carries with it into every choice and valuation task. In short, by restricting such interactions to within-lottery comparisons and ruling out any between-lottery effects, these models cannot account for betweenness cycles which undermine the existence of any wellbehaved indifference map within the Marschak-Machina triangle.
By contrast, regret theory allows between-lottery comparisons -but only on the payoff dimension. Essentially, it modifies the utility of any one payoff on the basis of the other payoff(s) offered by other lotteries under the same state of the world. In the 1987 formulation of regret theory, the net advantage of one payoff over another is represented by the ψ(. , .) function, which is assumed to be strictly convex, so that for all x 3 > x 2 > x 1 , ψ(x 3 , x 1 ) > ψ(x 3 , x 2 ) + ψ(x 2 , x 1 ) 18 . This enables the model to accommodate regret cycles, classic preference reversals and some violations of independence (although these latter require the additional assumption of statistical independence between lotteries). However, regret theory does not allow for any between-lottery interactions on the probability dimension -in fact, it takes probabilities exactly as they are -and therefore cannot account for violations of the sure-thing principle, nor similarity cycles, nor betweenness cycles under assumptions of statistical independence 19 .
Many non-EU models of the kind referred to above -and especially those designed to appeal to an audience of economists -have been influenced by the desire to meet criteria of rationality and/or generality and have therefore tried to minimise controlled by other means such as an 'editing' phase to spot them and eliminate them. The rankdependent procedure was a later development, proposed as a way of closing such 'gaps' and guaranteeing respect for dominance and transitivity. But the latter goal is driven more by normative precepts than by psychological insight; and this 'arranged marriage' between the various insights and goals may be seen as the reason why CPT ends up in a 'halfway house' position when viewed from the PRAM perspective. 18 Notice the resemblance to the PRAM formulation. If one were to take the differences between the pairs of payoffs and put them over any common denominator Z to get a measure of the relative force of each difference, PRAM would imply the same inequality i.e. [(
for all δ > 1. 19 Regret theory can produce cycles over triples involving a set of just three payoffs by manipulating the juxtaposition of those payoffs. Such 'juxtaposition effects' -see, for example, Loomes (1988) -can also be shown to be implied by PRAM. Details can be obtained from the author on request.
departures from the baseline of EUT and to invoke alternative axioms or principles driven by normative considerations. However, if there are between-lottery interactions operating on perceptions in the way modelled by PRAM, those axioms are bound to be transgressed. Thus any such model will fail in one way or another to accommodate the evidence and/or will need to invoke certain supplementary assumptions or forms of special pleading to try to cope with those data.
Models from a more psychological/behavioural may be less encumbered by such rigidities. Nevertheless, as discussed below, when such models are viewed from a PRAM perspective, it turns out that they too have imposed certain assumptions which limit their capacity to account for the evidence -except by invoking special additional assumptions of their own.
For example, Shafir et al. (1993) proposed an 'advantage' model (AM) which accommodates some departures from EUT and shares some insights with PRAM.
However, that model was concerned exclusively with choices between binary lotteries and money or probability equivalences for such lotteries. Thus it does not address tasks where one or both lotteries have more than two payoffs, which necessarily limits its scope relative to PRAM: by its nature, it does not deal with any lotteries in the interior of the M-M triangle, and therefore cannot deal with violations of betweenness or betweenness cycles. In addition, AM invokes different parameters for gains and losses, and calls on an additional principle, denoted by (*) -see their p.336 -to allow each of those parameters to vary further according to the nature of the task. This is in contrast with PRAM, which applies the same person-specific parameters across the board to all choice and equivalence tasks.
To see why AM needs to invoke different parameters and principles for different situations, consider how that model handles the most basic choice problem.
Adapting AM to the notation used in the current paper, the simplest choice involves a pair S = (x 2 , p 2 ) and R = (x 3 , q 3 ) where x 3 > x 2 and p 2 > q 3 and where the expected money values are, respectively, EMV S = x 2 × p 2 and EMV R = x 3 × q 3 . The AM choice rule is then:
p < where k G is a weight representing the relative importance placed upon the payoff and probability advantages. In simple choices, the expectation is that most people will place more weight on probabilities than payoffs, so including k G in the payoff part of the expression suggests k G < 1. When simple choices involve losses rather than gains, a different weight k L is used instead. Supplementary principle (*) invokes 'compatibility' in equivalence tasks, so that the same person's k's may be different for money equivalences than for straight choices, and different again for probability equivalences. And while, as stated earlier, I do not deny that such additional considerations may come into play, PRAM does not require them in order to accommodate the evidence, whereas without them the explanatory power of AM is greatly reduced.
The reason why AM is relatively limited and why it therefore needs supplementary assumptions may be found by examining the restrictions on PRAM implicit in Expression (14). EMV S is weighted by the simple difference between probabilities and the interaction between difference and ratio, which is crucial to the PRAM modelling of the perceived relative argument favouring S, is absent from (14).
So although AM can accommodate the 'usual' common ratio effect when q 3 /p 2 ≥ 0.5, applying it to cases where q 3 /p 2 is considerably less than 0.5 would entail an even stronger 'fanning out' pattern, whereas the data (and PRAM) suggest that the usual effect is moderated or even reversed in such cases. And while AM can (just about) accommodate Tversky's (1969) similarity cycles, it can only do so by invoking a value of k G "somewhat outside the common range, which is compatible with the fact that it [Tversky' s evidence] characterizes a pre-selected and therefore somewhat atypical group of subjects" (Shafir et al., 1993, p.351) . However, examples of similarity cycles reported in Bateman et al. (2006) cannot be accounted for 20 .
Meanwhile, explaining the typical form of preference reversal requires (*) to be invoked to allow a rather different k G to be used for valuation than for choice because AM is not generally compatible with the kinds of choice cycles that mimic the preference reversal phenomenon. This limitation relative to PRAM appears to stem 20 For example, in Experiment 2 described there, participants chose between pairs of lotteries {P, R}, {R, S} and {P, S} where the three lotteries were: P = (£25, 0.15); R = (£15, 0.20); S = (£12, 0.25). Out of 21 participants (from a total of 149 in the sample) who exhibited choice cycles, 20 were in the 'Tversky' direction i.e. P f R, R f S, but S f P. However, there is no value of k G compatible with this cycle. In particular, R f S requires k G > 0.25, while S f P requires k G < 0.154. So although there may be some cycles compatible with AM, there are also some very strong asymmetric patterns which the model does not readily accommodate.
from the fact that the [(x 3 -x 2 )/x 3 ] term on the right hand side of (14) does not actually use the ratio of relative advantages (which would require the denominator to be x 2 ) and does not allow for the perceptual effects represented in PRAM by raising the ratio to the power δ. In the absence of modelling that effect, AM tries to compensate with a combination of (*) and k G .
The 'contrast-weighting' model proposed by Mellers and Biagini (1994) , with its emphasis on the role of similarity, is closer in both spirit and structure to PRAM.
The key idea is that similarity between alternatives along one dimension/attribute tends to magnify the weight given to differences along the other dimension(s). The model is framed in terms of strength of preference for one option over another.
Applied to a pair of lotteries where S = (x 2 , p 2 ; 0, 1-p 2 ) and R = (x 3 , q 3 ; 0, 1-q 3 ) and where x 3 > x 2 and p 2 > q 3 , the judged strength of preference for S over R is given by
.π(q 3 ) β(x) where u(.) gives the utilities of the payoffs and π(.) represents the subjective probabilities of receiving those payoffs, while α(p) and β(x) are, respectively, the contrast weights applied as exponents to those indices.
To make the comparison with PRAM easier to see, let us suppose that choice between S and R maps to strength of preference in an intuitive way, so that S is chosen when strength of preference for S over R is positive and R is chosen when that strength of preference is negative. On that basis, and with some straightforward rearrangement, we have:
p < which might be read as saying that the choice between S and R depends on whether the strength of preference favouring S on the probability dimension is greater than, equal to, or less than the strength of preference favouring R on the payoff dimension.
Put into this form, it is easier to identify the difference between PRAM and this contrast weighting (CW) model. PRAM expresses the basic ratio of arguments within each dimension in a form which can take values less than or greater than 1 (depending on the relative magnitudes of advantage within a dimension) and then expresses the perception of each ratio as a continuous nonlinear function which reflects interactions between ratios and differences. The CW model proposed in Mellers and Biagini (1994) takes its exponents α(p) and β(x) as depending just on the absolute differences between p 2 and q 3 and between x 3 and x 2 , and as taking one of just two values -one when differences are 'small' and the two indices in question are judged 'similar' and another when differences are 'large' and the two indices are judged 'dissimilar'. In this respect, the CW model has much in common with the similarity analysis suggested by Rubinstein (1988) and Leland (1994 Leland ( , 1998 , using a dichotomous similar/dissimilar judgment. However, it was precisely in order to overcome the limitations of such a formulation and to allow many more diverse applications that PRAM was developed. Mellers and Biagini note on p.507 that "a more general representation would allow weights that are a continuous function of the absolute difference along a dimension", but they do not provide such a representation. PRAM might be seen as developing the CW/similarity insights broadly in the direction which
Mellers and Biagini considered would be useful.
A somewhat different line of development was pursued by Gonzalez-Vallejo (2002) . The primary focus of that paper was to embed a deterministic similarity 'core' in a stochastic framework. Using the terminology from that paper, the deterministic difference between two alternatives is denoted by d, and the decision maker chooses the option with the deterministic advantage if and only if d ≥ δ + ε, where δ is a 'personal decision threshold' and ε is a value representing noise/random disturbance, drawn from a distribution with zero mean and variance σ 2 .
For the pair of basic lotteries S = (x 2 , p 2 ; 0, 1-p 2 ) and R = (x 3 , q 3 ; 0, 1-q 3 ) where x 3 > x 2 and p 2 > q 3 , Gonzalez-Vallejo's Equation (3) gives the deterministic
. In this formulation, S is preferred to / indifferent to / less preferred than R according to whether the proportional advantage of S over R on the probability dimension is greater than, equal to or less than the proportional advantage of R over S on the payoff dimension -with, in both cases, this proportion being the difference expressed as a fraction of the higher value. Because of the centrality of the difference between these proportions, Gonzalez-Vallejo calls this the proportional difference (PD) model.
Notice that, as expressed here, PD effectively says that the deterministic component amounts to a preference for the alternative with the higher expected money value. If the money values of the payoffs were replaced by their von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, the deterministic component would amount to a 'core' preference for the alternative with the higher EU; and if payoffs were mapped via v(.) to a value function and probabilities were converted to decision weights in the manner proposed by rank-dependent models, the core preference would correspond with CPT or some other rank-dependent variant. So departures from expected value / expected utility / subjective expected value maximisation models are accounted for by PD in terms of the way that an individual's decision threshold δ departs from 0.
In this respect, δ plays a role not unlike that played by k G in Shafir et al. (1993) . And as with AM, the only way the PD model can accommodate a wide variety of different regularities is by allowing δ to vary from one regularity to another. A particular problem caused by the proportionality at the core of this model is that scaling down p 2 and q 3 by the same factor leaves d unchanged, so that the usual CRE would require δ to change systematically according to the scaling of the probabilities.
That would also be required in order to allow both similarity cycles and regret cycles to be accommodated 21 . Likewise, the 'fourfold attitude to risk' patterns would require not only the size but also the sign of δ to change from one choice to the next:
choosing a small-probability high-payoff lottery over a sure sum with the same EMV (i.e. where d = 0) requires a δ that favours the payoff proportion, whereas choosing the same sure sum over a large-probability moderate-payoff lottery with the same EMV (so that d is still 0) requires a δ of the opposite sign. In short, to accommodate a wide variety of different departures from EV/EU maximisation, we need PD to specify how δ varies from one set of tasks and parameters to another. GonzalezVallejo does not provide such a theory. Arguably, PRAM makes such a theory unnecessary, since it accounts for the diverse effects within the same 'core' specification.
The other issue addressed by Gonzalez-Vallejo (2002) and in a different way by Mellers and Biagini (1994) is the stochastic nature of actual choice behaviour.
Although Gonzalez-Vallejo's approach to this was to use a standard Fechnerian error term, that is not the only way of incorporating a stochastic element into choice behaviour: as discussed by Loomes and Sugden (1995) , a 'random preference' specification, in the spirit of Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1963) may be an alternative route to take. However, a comprehensive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of different variants of 'error' specification, as well as the issues raised for fitting models and testing hypotheses, could constitute a whole new paper, and is beyond the scope of the present enterprise 22 . Suffice it to say that PRAM could be adapted to either approach, but the incorporation of a stochastic element by allowing any individual's behaviour, as well as any sample's behaviour, to be modelled in terms of some distribution over both α and δ would appear to be a route that could be profitably investigated in future research. Meanwhile, taking a deterministic form of PRAM as reflecting some 'central tendency' values of α and δ is sufficient for the purposes of the present paper. to be poor at dealing with some patterns that seem easy to predict just by looking at them and offers no guidance about equivalence judgments.
The essence of the problem here is encapsulated in the second part of the title of the paper: "making choices without trade-offs". A rule is either satisfied or it is not, and this dichotomous structure of the model causes it to neglect more holistic considerations, which can then only be dealt with by invoking another heuristic. As the authors acknowledge (p.425-6), PH's predictive power is poor in cases involving large discrepancies between expected values working in the opposite direction to the PH sequence of rules 23 . This reflects the model's lack of a trade-off mechanism that would allow such expected value differentials to play a suitably weighted role. In the absence of such a mechanism, PH also offers no obvious way of handling equivalence tasks, despite the fact that participants seem perfectly able to make such judgments.
Although this issue is not addressed by Brandstatter et al., one supposes that equivalences would require a further set of rules. It would be interesting to see what such a set would entail, how it would relate to the choice rules -and how well it would be able to accommodate the conjunctions between certainty equivalents, probability equivalents and choices discussed above. PRAM requires no such additional set(s) of rules/principles: the appropriate trade-offs are intrinsic to the model, and the same two free parameters can be applied equally well to the various equivalences as to pairwise choices.
Concluding Remarks
The past thirty years have seen the development of an array of 'alternative' theories which try in different ways to account for the many well-established regularities observed in individual decision experiments: see Starmer (2000) for a review of "the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk"; and Rieskamp et al. (2006) for a review from a more psychological perspective.
However, no single theory has so far been able to organise more than a (fairly limited) subset of the evidence. This has been something of a puzzle, because all of the regularities in question are generated by the same kinds of people. In fact, in some experiments, the very same group of individuals exhibit many of them one after the other in the same session. So it would seem that there really ought to be a single model of individual decision making under risk that is able to account for most if not all of them.
It has been argued above that PRAM (or something very much like it) offers a solution to that puzzle by representing the way that many participants make pairwise choices and judge equivalences in cases where there are no more than three payoffsthis being the nature of the great majority of experimental designs. Using some simple propositions about perception and judgment, PRAM shows how a typical sample of participants may, between them, be liable to exhibit all of the following regularities:
the common ratio effect; violations of betweenness; betweenness cycles; the reflection effect and 'fourfold' attitudes to risk; 'similarity' cycles; 'regret' cycles; and preference reversals involving both certainty and probability equivalences. Moreover, all of these results were generated without requiring any curvature of c(.), nor any special assumptions about framing effects, reference points, failures of procedural invariance, and so on.
However, the development of alternative decision theories during the past thirty years has often been influenced by the desire to incorporate/defend particular assumptions or axioms for normative reasons. But if the experimental data are actually generated by PRAM-like perceptions influenced by between-lottery comparisons, any model which disallows such between-lottery influences on either or both dimensions is liable to fail descriptively. The data simply will not fit such theories, and the price to be paid for trying to force them into the wrong mould is that various supplementary assumptions or forms of special pleading have to be invoked and/or that the estimates arising from fitting such mis-specified models could be seriously misleading.
On the other hand, it has to be acknowledged that although pairwise comparisons involving no more than three payoffs have been the staple diet of individual decision experiments, they are only a small subset of the kinds of risky decisions which are of interest to psychologists, economists and decision theorists.
What if the kinds of between-lottery effects modelled by PRAM are specific to -or at least, particularly pronounced in -these two-alternative three-payoff cases? If this is the case, how far can we extrapolate from these data to other scenarios?
For example, suppose we want a model which organises behaviour when decision makers are choosing between a larger number of more complex risky prospects. Perhaps the types of pairwise comparisons modelled by PRAM are less important in such cases: indeed, perhaps they are superseded altogether by other judgmental considerations. It might be that a model which fails on almost every front in the special class of experimental pairwise choices could do much better in other scenarios which bring additional and/or different judgmental processes into play 24 .
This raises the possibility that the usefulness of any particular theory as a descriptive model of decision behaviour may depend on the characteristics of the class of problems to which it is being applied; and different models may be more or less successful in different kinds of scenarios. At the very least, this points to a need for experimental research to pay more attention not only to other areas of the M-M triangle and to choices connected by lines with different gradients within that triangle, but also to choices involving more complex lotteries and/or larger choice sets.
